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THE EXPLOITABILITY TESTINTERPRETATION AND POTENTIALITIES*
L. F. E. GOLDIEt

Recently the United States Government has granted leasing
blocks of oil and gas lands extending beyond the two hundred metre,
or one hundred fathom' (or six hundred foot) bathymetric contour
line and outside this country's territorial waters. These leases were
purportedly made under the authority vested in the federal government by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953.2 While
domestically the statute may provide an adequate authority, inter-

nationally the question of this governmental action's validity, with
* Based on a paper presented at the Panel on "International Control of Resources
of the Seas," Friday, April 7, Conference of Western Law Schools, Annual Meeting
held on April 7-8, 1967 at the University of British Columbia Law School, B.C.,
Canada.
f Visiting Professor of Law, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey, 1967-69;
Professor of Law, Loyola University, Los Angeles.
1. For a treatment of these 2 isobaths, i.e., the 200 metre and the 100 fathom (or
600 foot) contour lines as being approximately equivalent, see the International Law
Commission, Report Covering the Work of its Eighth Session, 23 April-4 July 1956,
Chapter II. Law of the Sea, I. Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea, Part H. High
Seas, Section III. Continental Shelf, art. 67, and Commentary, 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9
at 11, 41-42, [1956] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 253, 264, 296-97, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956).
It should be noted that the United States Outer Continental Shelf Lands Maps
which have been made for the purpose of showing submarine oil and gas leasing
blocks all show the 600 foot bathymetric contour line. This is treated by both the Bureau of Land Management and U.S. Geological Survey as the depth definition of the
continental shelf and as equivalent to the 200 metre isobath in the Continental Shelf
Convention.
There may, however, be a considerable variation in lateral distance on the bed of
a gently sloping continental shelf area between the 100 fathom (or 600 foot) and 200
metre isobaths. Since a metre is approximately 39.37 inches, it may be seen that the 100
fathom isobath, being 600 feet or 7200 inches, is within the 200 metre isobath (this
latter being approximately 7874 inches), since it is 56 feet 2 inches (or just over 2
feet more than 9 fathoms) of depth less than the 200 metre line and will be within it
on the seabed. Depending on the degree of the submarine slope down into the deeper
zones, and its general configuration, there is an equivalent proximity laterally on the
surface of the continental shelf or slope region to the very rough approximation which
these figures show in the matter of depth. Since the possible approximation of the isobaths is so exceedingly rough, they should not be used interchangeably. In this article,
following Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, see note
6 infra and the accompanying text, reference will be made to the 200 metre bathymetric contour line or isobath in preference to the 100 fathom line, except where the
context demands reference to the latter.
2. 67 Stat. 462, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1964). The United States Government has
already mapped a considerable number of oil and gas leasing blocks off the Pacific
coast and existing either wholly or in part beyond the 600 foot (100 fathom) bathymetric contour line. Appendix I hereof sets out in tabular form the leasing blocks al-
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its necessary corollary of bringing the affected submarine areas within the exclusive sovereign rights of the United States over exploration and exploitation activities, cannot be so easily answered. At first
blush, perhaps, the "exploitability test," as set forth in Article 1 of
the Convention on the Continental Shelf,8 might offer an adequate
shield. If it is, then the question may be asked, to what depth would
this test protect domestic policies of extending a coastal state's power
to grant rights and administer activities under the deep oceans?
Whilst a strict interpretation of the exploitability test would require it to be limited to the ancillary role originally intended for it
both in the International Law Commission's deliberations and by
many of the delegates at the United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea held at Geneva on February 24-April 27, 1958, a more
liberal construction could enable that test to be used as a vehicle for
the kind of state ambitions which Professor Scelle attacked, and
which he argued could only be realized at the cost of many activities now held to be in the world community's interest. There are
many possible interpretations of the exploitability test, but from
the point of view of the present discussion, they may be viewed as
falling into one of two categories: the liberal or the restrictive (or
"strict") interpretation. The former term is used to indicate liberality towards extensive coastal state claims (and "cartographical
chauvinism" 5 ), whereas the latter points to a restrictive interpretation of the international law basis of such a claim-such a restrictive
view is, on the other hand, "liberal" towards the "community inready granted by the United States off the Pacific coast pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act which lie either entirely or in part beyond the 600 foot isobath.
At the time this writer conducted his most recent investigations with the officers of
the United States Government Bureau of Land Management and U.S. Geological Survey
(on June 26, 1968), no leases had been granted off the coasts of Texas and Louisiana
beyond the 600 foot bathymetric contour line, although a number of leases touched that
line, from the landward.
As of the above point of time maps of leasing blocks off the Alaska coast have not
been published, but the present plans provide for leases to 1000 feet in such maps.
This writer would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the courtesy and
kindness of the officers of the above federal government offices in showing him the
maps and files containing the raw data of Appendix I hereof.
3. Done April 29, 1958, [1964] 1 U.S.T. 471, 473, T.I.A.S. No. 5578 at 3, 499
U.N.T.S. 311, 312. This Convention came into force June 10, 1964, Secretary-General,
Status of Multilateral Conventions, Signatures, Ratifications, Accessions etc., Received
by the Secretary-General 1 to 30 June, 1964, Rep. No. 6 (1964) at iv, U.N. Doc. ST./
LEG. 3, Rev. 1 (mimeo. June 30, 1964).
4. See notes 15-19 infra and accompanying text.
5. To borrow an evocative phrase first coined by Dr. S. Whittemore Boggs. See
Boggs, National Claims in Adjacent Seas, 41 Geographical Review 185 (1951).
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terests" which traditionally have been protected by the freedom of
the seas.
In analysing the possibilities of the liberal interpretation of the
exploitability test, this article will also investigate the effectiveness of
arguments formulated in terms of the "public interest" and in terms
of Professor William T. Burke's rather similar concept of the
"contraposed" claims of community uses and coastal states' exclusivity. 7 Accordingly, this writer would like to indicate, preliminarily, that he cannot subscribe to an optimistic belief that an
equilibrium can be reached between claims for inclusive and exclusive uses long before states begin to appropriate the subsoil, the
beds, the volume, and the air of the deep oceans of this planet. Such
a belief may, perhaps, be misleading and dangerous, since it may
lull many supporters of the freedom of the seas into a false security.
I
AN ENCLOSURE MOVEMENT INTO THE DEEP OCEANS?

Article 1 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, adopted at
the eighteenth plenary meeting of the 1958 Conference on the Law
of the Sea, is as follows:
For the purpose of these articles, the term "continental shelf" is
used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas
adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a

depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources
of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine
areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.8

Clearly there are two tests9 embedded in this article as to what,
6. For a discussion of this term, and possible pitfalls in its use, see notes 20-29
infra and the accompanying text.
7. W. Burke, Ocean Sciences, Technology and the Future International Law of the
Sea passim, but especially at 54-55 (Mershon National Security Program, Pamphlet
Series No. 2, 1966) [hereinafter cited as "Burke"]. See also notes 20-29 infra and the
accompanying text.
8. See supra note 3.
9. Professor F. V. Garcia Amador goes further than the distinction drawn here.
He writes:
There is now a distinction between the broad categories of submarine areas
and also, as in the conclusions of the Inter-American Conference, between two
classes of rights: an existing right with regard to the continental shelf proper,
and a potential right with respect to the other areas covered by the definition.
See F. Amador, The Exploitation and Conservation of the Resources of the Sea
111-12 (1959).
The concept of a "potential right," of which Professor Garcia Amador writes in the
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in law, should be viewed as constituting the submarine area beyond
its territorial waters1" over which a coastal state may exercise its
sovereign rights with regard to exploration and exploitation activities and designate its continental shelf, namely, those of depth and
exploitability. Whilst it is true that neither of these tests represent
the geographers' continental shelf-the pedestal above the ocean
floor (or abyss) upon which the continental land masses stand-yet,
despite possibly wide divergences in any local situation between the
geographical shelf and the zone surrounded by the two hundred
metre bathymetric contour line, generally speaking there would appear to be an abstract and theoretical congruence between the continental shelf indicated by the two hundred metre isobath and the true
or geographical shelf. By contrast, the test of exploitability has no
claim to verisimilitude with geographical facts. On the other hand,
certain present-day scientific and technological developments point
to an increasing emphasis on that selfsame test. For example, direction drilling for oil and gas, Captain Jacques-Yves Cousteau's
Conshelf 1,11 and III, the United States Navy's Sea Lab, the many
developments of submersible craft, Edwin Link's Man-in-Sea Project, and many another project and discovery," all point to the fact
that states desiring to assert jurisdiction over such activities may be
in a position to make extensive continental shelf claims in terms of
exploitability rather than depth. Despite the fact that the drafting
history of Article 1 would show that the exploitability test was
intended by its framers to have a merely subordinate and ancillary
operation to the depth criterion, 2 technological developments
above quotation, may also be thought of as resembling a condition subsequent in the
common law of real property-indeed as a condition which operates to defeat the
claims of the actors who bring the operative facts into existence! This point will be
discussed further, infra. § IV, and see especially notes 42-46 and the accompanying text.
10. Further discussion in this study of states' rights over continental shelf regions
and beyond will assume that the area under examination is outside the limits of territorial waters (the "territorial sea").
11. For a graphic illustration of these developments, see Appendix II to Goldie,
The Contents of Davy Jones's Locker-A Proposed Regime for the Seabed and Subsoil,
22 Rutgers L. Rev. 1, 66 (1967) [hereinafter cited as "Goldie, Davy Jones's Locker"].
12. Art. 1 of the Commission's 1951 Draft Articles adopted the test of exploitability
for determining the extent of the "legal" continental shelf, i.e., the formula defined the
shelf as ". . . outside the area of territorial waters, where the depth of the superjacent
waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the sea-bed and subsoil."
See also International Law Commission, Report Covering the Work of its Third Session, 16 May-27 July 1951, Draft Articles on the Continental Shelf and Related Subjects, (and note especially para. 6 in the Commentary accompanying art. 2), 6 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. 9 at 17, [1951] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 123, 141, U.N. Doc. A/1858
(1951). In 1951 exploitability provided the sole criterion for determining the coastal
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may cause the gradual replacement of the depth criterion by
that of exploitability. This writer has argued elsewhere that despite
their drafting histories these two tests may well be viewed in the
future as being independent of one another. Indeed, an argument
could be developed asserting that they are postured so as to be
treated as conflicting. 3 He has also sought to demonstrate that if
state's zone of its legal continental shelf. In that draft the exploitability test was not
collateral with, let alone supplementary to, a criterion of depth as indicated by a bathymetric contour line. Standing by itself the exploitability test was quickly seen to lack
any precision and was criticised by many writers on that ground, including S. Whittemore Boggs in his article, Delimitations of Seaward Areas Under National Jurisdiction, 45 Am. J. Int'l L. 240, 245, 265-66 (1951) ; J. Feith, Report of the Forty-Fourth
Conference (Copenhagen) of the International Law Association 125, 126-27, 134
(1950) ; G. Gidel, Le Plateau Continental (Opening Address at the Fourth Annual
Conference of the International Bar Association, July, 1952), transl. as The Continental Shelf, 3 W. Aust'l. Ann. L. Rev. 87, 89-90 (Goldie transl. 1954) [hereinafter
cited as "Gidel"]; H. Waldock, Report of the Forty-Fifth Conference (Lucerne) of the
International Law Association 146 (1952) ; and a number of governments in their
Comments on exploitability as the sole test for determining the outer limits of the continental shelf, as formulated in the 1951 Draft Articles. See U.N. Gen. Ass., International Law Commission (Fran ois Rapporteur), 4th Report on the Regime of the High
Seas, 17-25, 101-03 (A/CN.4/60) (mimeo. Feb. 19, 1953).
As a result of a widespread support for the 200 metre (or 100 fathom) isobath,
the Commission adopted 200 metres or 100 fathom tests in art. 1 of its 1953 Draft
Articles on the Continental Shelf (and note para. 66 of the Comments), International
Law Commission, Report Covering the Work of its Fifth Session, 1 June-14 August
1953, 8 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9 at 12, 13, [1953] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 200, 212, 214,
U.N. Doc. A/2456 (1953), and see Comments on the Draft Articles para. 61 ibid.
Parenthetically it is of interest to note that the exploitability test was eliminated from
the 1953 Draft Articles I It was, however, restored in the Commission's 1956 Articles.
See the Commission's Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea: Part II High Seas,
Section III Continental Shelf. International Law Commission, Report Covering the
Work of its Eighth Session, 23 April-4 July 1956, 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9 at 4, 11,
41-42 [1956] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 253, 264, 296-97, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956). On
the International Law Commission's evaluation of the exploitability test, see its Commentary on art. 67 id., especially at 41 and 296. For views of the status of the exploitability test at the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea at Geneva,
see 2 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Geneva 1958, Official Records
(Plenary Meetings) 12-13, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/38, Sales No.: 58.V.4, Vol. II
(1958) ; 6 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Geneva 1958, Official
Records (Fourth Committee) 2 (Gros), 4 (Gutteridge), 9 (Alvarez Aybar), 19
(Whiteman), 24 (Buu-Kinh), 26-27 (Gomez Robledo), 31-32 (Patey), 34 (Carbajal),
40 (Whiteman), 42 (Nikolic, Wershof, Jhirad); but for a contrary view see id. 5
(Rubio), 6 (Krispis), 9-10 (Caicedo Castilla), 16 (Barros), 17 (Rosenne), 25 (Garcia
Amador), 29-30 (Carty), 33 (Ruiz Moreno), 37 (Quarshie), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/42,
Sales No.: 58.V.4, Vol. VI (1958). See also Appendix II.
On possible contraposed evaluations of the clause inserting the test, see Burke 54-55.
See also notes 20-24 infra and the accompanying text.
13. See L. Goldie et al., A Symposium on the Geneva Conventions and the Need for
Future Modifications, The Law of the Sea: Offshore Boundaries and Zones 265. 275-76
(L. Alexander ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as "Goldie, Geneva Conventions"]. See also
Goldie, Davy Jones's Locker 11.
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these tests are placed in opposition and conflict, then, at least on a
"liberal" interpretation of its terms, the exploitability test must
prevail.' 4 Such an opposition of these criteria, and victory for the
exploitability test, could be most deleterious to the continued vitality
of the doctrine of the freedom of the seas, and to the interests of
all those who rely on it for their rights to navigate, to fish, and to
explore for and exploit the fixed resources of the seabed and its
subsoil. The world could be faced with a vast enclosure movement
of the oceans.
Indeed, in an article written over a decade ago, the late Professor
Georges Scelle 1 5 excoriated the continental shelf doctrine, as it was
then being developed by the International Law Commission, on the
ground that it would prove to be little more than a legal fiction',
camouflaging unlimited state ambitions to enclose the oceans by
means of "faustrecht.' ' 7 He envisaged the possibility of the great
oceans being enclosed both outward until a thalweg in the abyss was
reached, and upward to embrace the superjacent sea and the superambient air within the territorial sovereignties of the coastal states.
Despite the potentialities of the continental shelf doctrine, as presently developed, for supporting unlimited extensions into the high
seas, such an enclosure movement need not become inevitable, provided that the definition of the continental shelf regions over which
14. L. Goldie, Geneva Conventions 276. See also L. Goldie, Davey Jones's Locker 11.
15. G. Scelle, Plateau Continental et Droit International, 59 Revue Generale de
Droit International Public 5 (1955) [hereinafter cited as "Scelle"].
16. Id. at 39-40, 54-55. See also Scelle's comment that the continental shelf "n'est
qu'un camouflage de leurs [i.e., states'] ambitions exclusives", id., at 40. The evaluation
of legal fictions or camouflages here is distinguishable from that put forward by Professor Lon Fuller. See Fuller, Legal Fictions (pts 1-3), 25 111. L. Rev. 363, 513, 877 (193031).
As a result of exposure to the history of international law, this writer cannot accept
Professor Fuller's thesis (and, presumably, Professor Scelle would be of like mind)
that:
The linguistic sense of generations of lawyers has been, in the main, adequate to sift the chaff from the wheat and to keep the language of the law safe
from the opposing disasters of linguistic stagnation and a grotesque fecundity.
(Id. 379)
Although a long-term view of the histories of Roman and English law might justify
a reliance on "the linguistic sense of generations of lawyers," international law can
show us many examples of "grotesque fecundity." The submission here is that the task
of sifting, or of cutting and pruning (to keep faithful to Professor Fuller's agricultural
metaphor of "grotesque fecundity") has traditionally fallen, not on the legal profession
as a whole, but those who wield public authority such as the courts and the legislatures.
Where these are lacking, as they are in international law, then a happy insouciance
may itself become a danger, and international lawyers should be especially careful in
permitting legal fictions to flourish.
17. G. Scelle, supra note 15, at 19.
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a coastal state may assert sovereign rights is made to rest exclusively on the test of depth. For the argument is that, generous as
the permissions of the continental shelf doctrine as a whole may
be, they do not, as such, justify Professor Scelle's fears-except
when the definition of the shelf itself may be determined merely by
reference to exploitability. This present study, in contrast with that
by Professor Scelle, expresses concern for the potentiality of the
exploitability test as justifying arguments (albeit fictional ones) of
considerable value to states with impulses to limn maps of the oceans
with their national colors,"' rather than such an apprehension for
the continental shelf doctrine as a whole.
Can an analysis of the terms of Article 1 and, more generally, of
the Continental Shelf Convention, be developed which demonstrates
that its framers did not intend the exploitability test to be available
as a vehicle permitting the unilateral extensions of state power out
into the bed of the high seas, into the abyss itself?1 9 Clearly an
exercise in construing the words themselves will not be conclusive,
unless their persuasiveness is based not only on reason but also on
interest. How may the interests in play, the community interests and
the exclusive interests, affect the future of the freedom of the seas?
II
NO NEED FOR PESSIMISM?
"NATURAL EQUILIBRIUM" TO THE RESCUE?

In applying the fertile and illuminating sociological analysis developed by Professor Myres S. McDougal and his associates, Professor William T. Burke2' has given us, in contrapuntal terms, an
analysis of the claim to extend continental shelf rights into the area
of the regime of the high seas and the counterclaims which would be
contraposed against them. He defines the expansionist claim in the
following terms:
This claim would contend that the definition of the shelf incorporated therein is flexible and that the area of exclusive coastal controls extends outward to the limits of2 1 all exploitation, including the
mining of surficial sea-floor sediments.
18. I.e., indulge in "cartographical chauvinism." See supra note 5 and the accompanying text.
19. Cf. G. Scelle, supra note 15.
20. W. Burke, supra note 7.
21. Id. at 55.
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Unlike Professor Scelle, Professor Burke tends to see a possible
eventual balance between such a claim and a "contraposed claim"
(which may itself be viewed as a "primary claim" and not merely as
a "counter-claim" 22 ) for inclusive and community access. In terms
of determining the legal extent of coastal states' continental shelves,
such a contraposed claim would assert:
• . . that the shelf is defined by treaty in terms of the depth at which
exploitation is possible, but would observe that the situation envisaged at Geneva did not include the possibilities now emerging in deep
oceanfloor mining. Furthermore, it could be argued in reply, the
policies that supported the allocation of the adjacent shallow submarine regions to the adjacent state for certain purposes are not, at
least not obviously, pertinent to allocation of the deep ocean floor to
23
states adjoining on that ocean.
Thus we find both the exclusive territorial claim seeking to advance into the ocean abyss under the banner of an extended interpretation of the exploitability test, and the countervailing community claim resisting this advance by invoking a restrictive interpretation of Article 1. The result, so Professor Burke would seem to tell
us, would be an equilibrium between these two sets of claims, and
"[h]ence there is no reason to regard the broad language of the
Continental Shelf Convention as necessarily incorporating the general expectation that the deeper areas are to be allocated to adjoining, but non-adjacent, states. ' 24 This possibility of an eventual
balance encourages a laissez faire approach.
With respect, this writer would submit that to suggest a resultant
equilibrium which arises "naturally" between claims of exclusivity
of access with those asserting community access at the point where
the seabed and subsoil subject to states' claims of sovereign rights
remain "adjacent shallow submarine regions," and to rest with a
laissez faire policy with respect to establishing alternative regimes
of control and restraints on states' advance into the deep oceans, may
be unrealistic. Such an equilibrium may be achieved before coastal
states' claims into the ocean meet at a median line or a thalweg, as
feared by Professor Scelle; but it may not be reached until long after
the continental shelf and borderlands have been left behind in a race
for submarine claims. Internationally, the institutional arrangements
22. Id. at 54.
23. Id. at 55.
24. Id.
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are constructed so as to favor assertions of exclusive claims at the expense of inclusive ones. Thus, for example, the history of the two
Geneva Conferences on the Law of the Sea tends to show how much
more easily the majority of states seem able to identify their interests
in terms of exclusive uses of the sea rather than in terms of inclusive
uses. Similarly, within most states the preponderance of political pressure appears, at least at the present time, to favor policies of exclusivity. These points are dramatically illustrated by the United
States' and Great Britain's recent reversals of policy with respect to
their traditional demands of a maximum area for the regime of the
high seas. 25 Do not the enclosure movements in England and in the
western states of this country provide cautionary tales? When, in
these histories, was an "equilibrium" reached?
When the United States and Great Britain reverse their traditional policies of claiming minimum sea areas in which their own
nationals may enjoy exclusive fishery rights and extend the zones of
their exclusive coastal fisheries, then there is indeed evidence of an
observable preponderance of interests in the international arena asserting exclusive claims over those which advocate inclusive rights.
This evidence, in itself, surely underlines the singular appositeness
of drawing parallels from the enclosure movements in English and
American history. The weakness of interests advancing inclusive
claims may be traced, in part at least, to the failure of the international community to develop international, let alone supranational,
institutions protecting interests favoring inclusive uses and vindicating the retention of the high seas in the public domain. The danger
which Professor Scelle pointed out is not so much that the interests
supporting the public domain in the high seas will disappear, but that
claims made on their behalf will be impotent and will fail through
diffuseness and a want of focus and direction. In brief, then, the first
criticism is that there is no security as to when and where Professor
Burke's beneficent equilibrium will be reached, if it is reached at all.
Accordingly, the acceptance of a laissez faire policy should be
abandoned.
A second cause for hesitating to rely on theories expecting a resultant equilibrium to develop from the counterpoint of interests
supporting exclusive and inclusive uses, respectively, of the seas'
25. See, e.g., the Fishery Limits Act, 1964, c. 72, and the Territorial Waters Order
in Council 1964. For a similar development in United States policy, see Act to Establish a Contiguous Fishery Zone Beyond the Territorial Sea of the United States, Public
Law No. 89-658, 80 Stat. 908 (1966).
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resources is that there is an inarticulate and unproven major premise
of the whole underlying theory of this position (in common with the
theory in domestic politics known as "group theory" to which it
bears a number of resemblances), namely, that the opposing interests are in a symmetrical dialectic. 26 Those who resort to group
theory to explain domestic political phenomena have still to prove
that the interests upon which they rely represent historical forces,
are quantifiable, and will reach a viable resultant or a balanced opposition in their outcome. Furthermore, before group theory concepts
can be significantly applied to the international arena to provide
viable hypotheses for legal analysis, those who advance them have
the burden of establishing the modalities of their translation from
the domestic to the international arenas. This they have not yet
done.
Finally, the value of resorting to such phrases as "inclusive uses,"
and "public interest" or "community interest" as hypotheses of
analysis may be questioned-at least until the specific contents of
these phrases have been dissected and analysed in terms of the
forces seeking to extend state claims beyond the continental shelf
and those seeking to maintain the freedom of the seas. To act on
the assumption that these terms (which may well have irreplaceable
utility as formal concepts) do have, ipso facto, a general meaning
and content over and above that supplied in each concrete case,
invites their use as cloaks to camouflage the subjective values of the
user, or as fictions either to be employed to fulfill a "hair shirt" function,2 7 or perhaps to justify some compromise of the moment. An
example of these phrases' "hair shirt" function, in the present context, would be their use to restrain a coastal state, afire with cartographical chauvinism, from making such extreme maritime claims
as, for example, those now asserted by the "CEP" group of states. 28
26. This criticism has been pointed up by the late Professor V. 0. Key's trenchant
example:
The lobbyists for electric utilities, for example, are eternally on the job;
the lobbyists for the consumers of this monopolistic service are ordinarily conspicious by their absence. V. Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups 166
(4th ed. 1958).
27. See G. Shubert, Is There a Public Interest Theory?, V Nomos 162, 175 (1962).
28. This group of states takes its initials from those of the three original nations
(Chile, Ecuador and Peru) which claim jurisdiction over the seabed and subsoil, the
volume of the seas and the superambient air for at least a distance of 200 miles seaward of their coasts and irrespective of depth. The bases of these claims are formulated in terms of "bioma" or "eco-system" theories. For an indication of these theories
and their relation to the CEP claims, see 5 United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea, Geneva 1958, Official Records (Third Committee) 6-7 (Peru), U.N.
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Again, they are available to the government of a coastal state
having domestic commitments to expand its maritime jurisdiction
should it give ground to, or reach a compromise with, states advancing claims under the banner of the freedom of the seas. Alternatively, invocations of "community", or "public", or "non-exclusive
interests" are available to denigrate the doctrine of the freedom of
the seas as merely a camouflage for shielding the selfish interests of
the "traditional maritime states"2 9 and for continuing their domination of seaborne commerce and of ocean fisheries. These phrases,
when not provided with an empirical content, are equally available
as slogans for those upholding or rejecting the freedom of the seas
doctrine. In this way they tend to cut out the light which might
otherwise bathe the subject in understanding, and which alternative
approaches might have shed. They add heat as a result of their
subjectivity.
III
THE EXPLOITABILITY TEST AND
TREATY INTERPRETATION

In addition to examining contemporary theories concerning the
interplay of forces shaping the direction of treaty interpretation, a
Doc. A/CONF. 13/41, Sales No. :58.V.4, Vol. V (1958); Chile, Ecuador and Peru,
Declaration on the Maritime Zone, Santiago, Chile, Aug. 18, 1952. For a reproduction
of this and the Parties' accompanying declarations and agreements (together constituting the "Santiago Declaration"), as well as subsequent and supplementary declarations and agreements, see B. MacChesney, Situation, Documents and Commentary
on Recent Developments in the International Law of the Sea 265-89 (Naval War
College Blue Book Series No. 51, 1956). See also S. Bayitch, Interamerican Law of
Fisheries, an Introduction with Documents 42-47 (1957) ; B. Auguste, The Continental
Shelf-The Practice and Policy of the Latin American States with Special Reference
to Chile, Ecuador and Peru 187-92 (1960); and U.S. Department of State, Santiago
Negotiations on Fishery Conservation Problems (1955). For a polemical defense of
the CEP claims and policies, see, e.g., Cisneros, The 200 Mile Limit in the South Pacific:
A New Position in International Law with a Human and Juridical Content, ABA,
Section of Int'l and Comp. Law, 1964 Proceedings 56 (1965). Particular note should
be taken of the criticism administered to the CEP claims in Kunz, Continental Shelf
and International Law: Confusion and Abuse, 50 Am. J. Int'l L. 828, 835-50 (1956).
The subject of the CEP claims, in the wider setting of the Inter-American Conferences and the policies of Latin American States generally will be the subject of a
later study by this writer.
29. For a discussion of this phrase, and of a few of its interesting ironies, see L.
Goldie, Recognition and Dual Nationality-A Problem of Flags of Convenience, 39
Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 220, 226-27 n. 7 (1963). In the context of this present study of competitions for the resources of the oceans and for the profitable markets for disposing
of those resources, the term "traditional maritime states" lumps together those nations
which tend to assert inclusive uses. For an example of the irony just indicated, one need
look no further than Norway-demanding freedom to fish for the basking shark in
Scottish waters while she still encloses as part of her internal waters vast areas of the
North Sea.
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brief analysis of the words and formulae selected by the framers of
the Continental Shelf Convention to express their agreement might
well provide some preliminary, if provisional, solutions. This enterprise will be embarked upon with not only a full realization of the
fragility of verbal exegesis, but also bearing in mind Lord McNair's
warning when he wrote: "There is no part of the law of treaties
which the text-writer approaches
with more trepidation than the
' 30
question of interpretation.
Although a liberal construction of Article 1 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf may, at first blush, appear to justify
the allowance of greatly extended claims by coastal states to the
resources of the seabed and subsoil of the oceans beyond their continental and insular shelves, reflection will show that such an approach provides an uncertain guide for solving the problem under
discussion. As Professor Hyde pointed out:
One encounters difficulty, however, in finding a case where the
statement favorable to liberal construction is other than a dictum
supplemental to reasons which in themselves have afforded sufficient
grounds for the conclusions actually reached concerning the sense in
which the contracting parties employed the terms of their choice. 3'
This being so, Article 1 of the Convention should be construed in
"accordance with the ordinary meaning given" to its terms, "and in
the light of its object and purpose. ' 32 In such an enterprise it first
behooves the enquirer to examine the intention of the framers, as
revealed from within the four corners of the Convention. But first,
as a preliminary step, a brief review of a debate which is now developing with respect to the application of the exploitability test
may provide useful perspectives before plunging into a documentary
exegesis. There are those who argue that any coastal state may
assert sovereign rights to "continental shelf" areas beyond the two
hundred metre bathymetric contour line if the resources of the zone
claimed could be exploited by the application of the skills at the
disposal of the world's most advanced state. This position is opposed
by authorities who argue that the test of exploitability depends on
the technological capabilities of the coastal state actually asserting a
30. A. McNair, Law of Treaties 364 (1961).
31. C. Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United
States 1480 (2d ed. 1945).
32. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties art 27
para. 1, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9, at 14, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 169, 181, 217,
U.N. Doe. A/6309/Rev. 1 (1966). And see Commentary, id. 219, 220-21.
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claim to exercise sovereign rights under this test. For the purpose
of the present discussion the former construction of the exploitathe "absolute" standard, and the latter the
bility test will be called
"relative" standard.8 Vice President Franklin has expressed the
former position with great clarity in the following statement:
This depth which admits of exploitation should be interpreted
absolutely in terms of the most advanced technology in the world, and
not relatively in terms of the particulartechnology of any one coastal
state.84

This position should be contrasted with the view expressed by the
United States Senate Committee on Commerce which evaluated the
exploitability test in its Report 5 on the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Bill86 (later the Act of 1966 bearing the
same name8 7 ) in the following terms:
Thus the Convention conveys both specific and immediate rights
and prospective or potential rights, the latter to be acquired only as a
result of national effort and achievement.38
Both of the foregoing tests may be classified as "potential situa-

tion" tests, since they do not refer to the actual exploitability of a
given continental shelf area in the light of the resources, technologies,
capital and equipment in fact brought to bear, and in the light of the

exploitation actually being conducted and/or developed. They only
33. This is to adopt from other branches of the law the dichotomy between "relative" and "absolute" tests. For the purposes of the present discussion of the exploitability test the term "relative" will be taken as indicating that a coastal state will only
be deemed capable of acquiring sovereign rights over those parts of a submarine
region off her coasts and beyond the 200 metre isobath which she can exploit on the
basis of her own technological development, or that of enterprises licensed by her. The
"absolute test," on the other hand, permits the coastal state to treat as subject to her
sovereign rights those submarine regions beyond the 200 metre isobath which could
be exploited by the most advanced technologies. This latter test applies irrespective
of the technical capabilities of the coastal states or of the enterprises they license.
34. C. Franklin, The Law of the Sea, Some Recent Developments 23 (Naval War
College Blue Book Series No. 53, 1960).
Similar views have been expressed by Mouton and Young. See M. Mouton, The
Continental Shelf 42 (1952) ; R. Young, The Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf: A First Impression, 52 Am. J. Int'l L. 733, 735 (1958).
35. S. Rep. No. 528, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. (1965) [hereinafter cited as "S. Rep. No.
528"].
36. S. 944, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. (1965).
37. Pub. L. 89-454, [1966] 1 Stat. 203.
38. S. Rep. No. 528 at 11.
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refer, at best, to a hypothetical situation-what would the sovereign
rights of the coastal state be if a region beyond the shelf were to be
exploited? That is, the test depends upon the abstract possibilities
of capability. Thus, jurisdiction and sovereign rights are not seen as
limited to actual exploitations extending beyond the two hundred
metre isobath, but to areas beyond that isobath which could fall
within the coastal state's sovereign rights by reference either to the
capabilities of the technologically most advanced state or, alternatively, to the technological development of the coastal state itself.
In its "Commentary" on Article 67 of its "Articles Concerning
the Law of the Sea," the International Law Commission provided
at least the starting point of a third position when it stated:

[T]he continental shelf might well include submarine areas lying at a depth of over 200 metres, but susceptible of exploitation by
in neighboring areas where the depth
means of installations erected
89
does not exceed this limit.

The submission here is that, both for policy purposes and to give
effect to the most literal interpretation of Article 1 of the Continental Shelf Convention, the exploitability test should be viewed as
allowing the coastal state no more than the power of asserting its
jurisdiction over exploitations beyond the shelf which began on the
shelf (i.e., on the landward side of the two hundred metre isobath)
and which subsequently developed beyond that line.40
Secondly, a large amount of the discussion of the exploitability
test's capacity to justify extensive continental shelf claims seaward
and out into the abyss ignores the fact that Article 1 requires the
continental shelf to be "adjacent to the coast . . .-41 This argument
may, indeed, appear at first to be stronger than it really is. Taken
by itself it must be inconclusive, since a shelf region can remain
"adjacent" to a coast on its landward side and yet extend seaward
out into the mid-ocean areas. Although this consideration is inconclusive when standing alone, it adds strength to other arguments
39. International Law Commission, Report Covering the Work of its Eighth Session, 23 April-4 July 1956, 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9 at 41, [1956] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n
253, 296, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956).
40. That this may not be the actual outcome of interpretation, but rather the test
under discussion may well provide a vehicle (albeit perhaps spurious, but nevertheless
strongly emphasized) for the promulgation of claims to the sea-bed and subsoil and,
in addition, to the volume of the waters and the superambient air, is the topic of §
III supra.
41. A/CONF. 13/L. 55 at 142.
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seeking to demonstrate that the intention of the Convention's
framers was to limit the continental shelf area to little more, at the
most, than the zone enclosed by the two hundred metre bathymetric
contour line.
The third argument begins with Professor F. V. Garcia Amador's
point that continental shelf claims dependent on the exploitability
test are "potential rights. ' 42 As such, they may appear initially to
be rights which spring up in favor of the coastal state, without any
previous and contraposed right having been vested in some other
state or citizen thereof. That this is true will be contested, and the
theory suggesting that rights created by the exploitability test are no
more than "potential rights" will be questioned. In creating new,
exclusive rights the test must, inevitably, have a divesting effect upon
pre-existing general international law rights. Thus, interests which
the citizens of overseas states may have viewed as guaranteed by
the freedom of the sea and clear of any future legal clouds, may,
in fact, suffer from a precariousness not altogether dissimilar from
those upon determinable fees or fees subject to executory interests
in the Anglo-American common law. In addition to the "potential
rights" of coastal states, there is a suppressed category of the "potential exposures" to deprivation of those who rely on the freedom
of the sea.
The formulation of the exploitability test, "to where the depth of
the superjacent waters admits of the exploration of the said areas,"
does not include any reliance on the element of "exploration." Nor
need the formulation of that test be viewed (and, it is submitted, it
should not be viewed) as including that separate activity by a
necessary implication. For, whereas Article 1 merely speaks of
"exploitation," without mentioning "exploration," Articles 2, 4 and
5 speak both of "exploration" and "exploitation", as it were in
tandem, thereby indicating the full range of activities over which
the coastal state is entitled to exercise sovereign rights.4 3 In elucidating this discrepancy between Article 1 and Articles 2, 4 and 5, a
preliminary point should be made, then a question proposed. The
preliminary point is this: Since differe'nt resources call for different
techniques in their exploitation, the exploitability test should, in
order to remain true to its meaning, only be applied as a basis for
extending a coastal state's sovereign rights over the exploitation of
each specific resource as that resource becomes "exploitable". For ex42. See F. Amador, supra note 9.

43.

Gidel 99. See also 96 and 106.
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ample, although manganese nodules may be won from great depths
in the near future, 44 any concept of "exploitability" in that context
would remain irrelevant, say, to mining for solid minerals in the
subsoil of a submarine continental terrace. Similarly, an application
of the exploitability test which might well be relevant to taking oil
and gas would hardly justify claiming continental shelf rights over a
sedentary fishery. 45 Now the question may be asked: If "exploration
is not a part of the exploitability test, then a coastal state may not
view exploration activities beyond its encircling two hundred metre
bathymetric contour line (assuming this to be beyond the territorial
sea) as falling under its continental shelf sovereign rights. But if the
contents of a submarine area's subsoil remain unknown, how, in the
light of the foregoing point of interpretation, can the exploitability
test apply in cases other than those of continuing an exploitation
out from the two hundred metre line and beyond the territorial sea ?
One may be tempted to answer that a coastal state has, in common
with all states, a right to regulate its own citizens' exploration no
less than their exploitation activities beyond the continental shelf adjacent to its coasts, and to conduct such exploration itself. This being so, such a reply might run: the coastal state may attach its
sovereign rights, by virtue of the exploitability test, to exploitations
begun under its aegis and beyond its shelf which result from explorations conducted by its citizens (or by corporate entities established under its laws) under general international law privileges
permitting all the citizens of all the states of the world to explore
for and exploit the resources of the oceans beyond the jurisdictional
areas of states on the ground that the high seas are res omnium
communis.

There is a central difficulty to this position. If a coastal state
claims to exercise authority over activities in a submarine area on
the premise of what general international law, rather than the continental shelf doctrine, allows, then so may any other state. That
is, any non-coastal state or its citizens may, under general inter44. See, e.g., J. Mero, The Mineral Resources of the Sea 127, 277-79 (1965).
45. The whole question of the quantum (to borrow yet again from the common
law of real property) of an interest which the exploitability test purports to vest in
the coastal state has not been faced by writers in international law. Yet this question,
in whatever terms and on whatever analogies it is presented, is necessarily central
to any thesis arguing for a liberal interpretation of the exploitability test. This writer
has argued elsewhere that the economic interests which coastal states purport to protect
by extending their jurisdictions seaward under the banner of the exploitability test
would be better protected by other institutional means, for example in terms of the
treaty regime proposed by this writer. See L. Goldie, Davy Jones's Locker 38-54.
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national law and on the basis of this reasoning, explore for resources
beyond the coastal state's continental shelf and territorial sea, but in
its immediate vicinity, in full equality with the coastal state's citizens. Having discovered a resource outside the two hundred metre
bathymetric contour line and the territorial sea surrounding the
coastal state, may not the non-coastal state assert a general international law right to exercise sovereign rights over the exploitation of
that resource which was discovered by exploration activities conducted by its citizens or by corporations created under its laws? The
operation of the exploitability test as creating "potential rights" in
such circumstances as these would be to have a divesting effect upon
the states under whose laws the activities were initiated and carried through to the point of establishing the possibility of an economic return. Again, explorations begun on the landward side of the
two hundred metre isobath, and continued beyond it, may not validly
be viewed as extending the exploitability test's protection to exploitations begun beyond that isobath and which have no commencing
point on its landward side. Finally, as has been previously observed,
the exercise of sovereign rights beyond the two hundred metre isobath over the exploitation of one resource (being an exploitation
activity which had begun on the landward side of that bathymetric
contour line) would not justify coastal states' claims to exercise any
similar authority over the exploitation of different resources beyond
the two hundred metre isobath which had begun there, rather than
within that contour line. For example, the exercise of sovereign
rights over activities beyond the two hundred metre line exploiting
oil and gas resources would not, of itself, justify a claim to exercise
similar rights over the exploitation of sulphur deposits or a sedentary
fishery.
Thus, because the term "exploration" is not expressly joined to
"exploitation" in Article l's formulation of coastal states' rights
over adjacent continental shelf regions, there would appear to be
little justification for treating rights defined only in terms of exploitation as necessarily including rights defined in terms of exploration. But if the exploitability test is referable only to exploitations
beyond the two hundred metre bathymetric contour line, then, because the activity to which the test is to be applied must be known,
it can only relate to exploitation activities begun on the landward
side of that line. If this argument is not accepted, and no difficulty
is seen in extending the coastal state's sovereign rights, by virtue
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of the exploitability test, to a resource beyond the two hundred
metre bathymetric contour line, when the exploration for that resource had been carried out in terms of a general international law
privilege, then the burden of proof is on the test's proponents to
tell us when a coastal state may validly appropriate the result of
explorations carried out beyond the two hundred metre isobath by,
or under the laws of, another state, and when the fruits of such exploration activities fall within the jurisdiction of the state under
whose aegis the exploration was originally carried out.
In brief, then, the supporters of the exploitability test's liberal
extension would argue that although all states, and their citizens
enjoy privileges of exploring the oceans' resources beyond the jurisdiction of the coastal state, whenever an exploration shows that a
submarine resource adjacent to an existing zone of continental shelf
jurisdiction is exploitable, then that zone is transformed from the
category of "high seas" to that of "continental shelf." Simple as such
a solution might appear, it is fraught with difficulties. For, should
Article 1 be viewed as changing the character of submarine areas
beyond the continental shelf (however defined) from high seas
areas open to exploration activities conducted under the laws of any
state distant or coastal, to areas under the coastal state's exclusive
sovereign rights over exploration and exploitation activities, then
the Article should set out the terms of such a divesting condition's
operation, and give some guidelines regarding the treatment of the
equities involved. In addition, some rules governing possible conflicts of claims and of governing laws in time should be provided,
perhaps in terms of a "critical date" 46 theory.
The fact that the Convention's framers never provided safeguards protecting the equities which a divesting effect of the exploitability test would place in jeopardy indicates, surely, that in
their view Article 1 was never drafted with even the thought of
such a possibility. To argue now for the recognition of such a right
as inhering in the exploitability test points to a further paradox. To
apply that test in the contingent manner envisaged, as for example
in Professor Garcia Amador's exposition, would be to divest the
enterprises whose explorations first established the area's exploitability and as a result of whose efforts the coastal state's extension of
its continental shelf claims by virtue of the exploitability test became
46. For a discussion of this concept, see L. Goldie, The Critical Date, 12 Int'l &
Comp. L. Q. 1251 (1963).
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possible. Instead of being applied to the advantage of those who
made the exploitability test concretely applicable to a given situation,
that test would operate to deprive them of the fruits of their labors,
transferring those fruits to be governed and taxed under the laws
of a state which had merely remained a passive onlooker-for it,
too, might have acted on the same basis as the state whose citizens
had invoked the privileges of the freedom of the seas. Furthermore, what would be the result of legislation by the coastal state
requiring that all continental shelf exploitations be carried on by
its citizens or corporations created under its laws and in which
either the state or its citizens had a controlling interest? Thus it
becomes clear that Article 1 is not adequate to support arguments
justifying 47 liberal extensions of the submarine areas subject to
coastal states' continental shelf sovereign rights. To assert the
contrary has the effect of turning the Article into a divesting clause
so far as the exploitability test is concerned, and to accord to coastal
states unlimited discretions to determine unilaterally, and without
recourse by other states, what submarine regions are to fall, under
internationallaw, within its exclusive sovereign rights. True, international law allocates such an unexaminable discretion to states in
many areas of international intercourse. But one of the major tasks
of contemporary international law is to reduce and tame the scope
of that discretion, not to enhance it.
As a practical matter the recognition of widely extending "potential rights" to be enjoyed by coastal states would have devastating
repercussions. For would not the de facto analogy, pointed to in
the preceding paragraphs, with the common law concepts of a power
of termination or of an executory interest, in the light of the paradoxical effect of their operation to defeat the rights of those who
created the possibility of their effectiveness, in reality lead to power
confrontations and a deterioration of the parties' relations to the
level of the old faustrecht doctrine which had plagued international
relations over-long?
IV
TWO PROBLEMS OF REPEAL

The United States grants of oil and gas leasing blocks beyond
the six hundred foot bathymetric contour line have all been made, so
47. For an example of such arguments, see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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far, off the West Coast.48 In comparison with the vast reaches of
the Pacific onto which these areas front, the encroachments beyond
that definitive contour line are negligible. (Bering Strait is not
within the scope of this discussion since its bed is above the hundred
fathom, and two hundred metre bathymetric level in marine depth.
Accordingly, the solution of any future boundary problems in that
area would be within the scope of Article 6.1 of the Continental
Shelf Convention without having to resort to vexing problems of
defining the shelf in terms of exploitability.)
On the other hand, in the Gulf of Mexico the United States has
not granted leasing blocks beyond the six hundred foot bathymetric
contour line. Here, in contrast with the Pacific coast of this country,
to extend exclusive oil and gas claims beyond that line could give
rise to problems of great delicacy. Is it enough to explain the contrast of United States policy concerning the Pacific coast leases with
that governing leases in the Gulf of Mexico in terms of prudential
policies-"what we can get away with"? The submission here is
that the orderly regulation of oil and gas and other mineral exploration and exploitation activities is needed and needed urgently,
but that this urgent need should not give countenance to extensive
state claims. The alternative to permitting states unilaterally to
exercise their discretion in deciding how far out the exploitability
test permits them to claim exclusive rights is to repeal the exploitability test as a basis for determining the extent of a continental
shelf region subject to a coastal state's exclusive rights, and replace
it by an international regime. However, fairness and equity may
well demand that those assertions of unilateral state competence
which have already led to the granting of exploration and exploitation activities in specific areas should be excluded from such a regime-a sort of grandfather clause could save these specific reliances
upon the former regime validated by the exploitability test-where
such reliances have not already given rise to international disputes
as to their justification or extent.
But it is possible to imagine cases where such a savings clause
would provide an insufficient protection if the exploitability test were
annulled. Some coastal states now assert certain claims which would
lose their present legal justification if the exploitability test were
revoked, but which the claimant states might well be loath to surrender. How, for example, could the United States still continue to
48. For a survey of these leases see Appendix I hereof.
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assert her exclusive jurisdiction over submarine parcels of oil and gas
lands which she has already leased, and which lie beyond the six
hundred foot isobath in the Santa Barbara Channel? 49 (Similar
considerations apply to the possibility of future leases beyond the
one hundred fathom line in the San Pedro Channel and the Gulf
of Santa Catalina.) How would the Republic of the Phillipines
continue to justify its claims to the seabed and subsoil of the Mindanao Sea and the Siburyan Sea? These examples could be multiplied where the territory of a state exists on both sides of a sea or
channel whose bed constitutes a geological and geographical unity
with the mainland and the island formations, but which exceeds a
hundred fathoms or two hundred metres in depth. Paradoxically,
Norway's problem with respect to the Vestfjorden (which exceeds
two hundred metres of depth in many places) was resolved by the
Fisheries Case.50 By this decision Norway was held to enjoy rights
of full territorial sovereignty, in contradistinction to the more
limited rights which the continental shelf doctrine assures, over not
only the seabed and subsoil of channels but also over the volume of
the sea and the superambient air of Vestfjorden. Perhaps a modification of the Fisheries Case, by which coastal states might receive
no more than continental shelf rights over the relatively few geographical features in the world where, as in the Santa Barbara
Channel, territorial sovereignty over dry land areas combines with
the geographical unity of the entire region to give to the whole a
unity in terms of both physical and political geography, could be
grafted onto the continental shelf doctrine. This proposal is tentatively offered at this stage, and its author is uncomfortably conscious that a doctrine of geographical unity could come to be extended greatly beyond its orginally intended scope and to resemble,
at least in its more questionable functions, the extensions of the
doctrines of continuity, contiguity and "the hinterland" which gave
a covering of apparent legality to many vast acquisitions of territory
in the age of colonialism. This writer has not lost sight of the fact that
the main purpose of this article is to advocate the excision from international law of a concept (namely the exploitability test) which
threatens to provide excuses for vast submarine claims. It would
indeed be a bitter irony if the concept of geographical unity provisionally indicated in these pages could be viewed as performing
a similar exculpatory function to that of the doctrines which justi49. See Appendix I hereof.

50. [1951] I.C.J. 116.
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fled many colonial acquisitions and extensions, or to that for which
the exploitability test has been criticised in preceding paragraphs.
V
A PROPOSAL-INTERNATIONAL CONTROL

One proposed design for the international control of the seabed
and subsoil of the oceans beyond the two hundred metre bathymetric contour line (and it is cast in heroic form) is that offered
by the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace in its
Seventeenth Report.51 It recommends that the United Nations General Assembly should proclaim the world community's title to the
oceans (including the volume of the waters more than twelve miles
for fishing52 and the circumambient air, as well as the seabed and
subsoil beyond a specifically defined continental shelf region.5 3 ) Consistently with this proposal, the Commission advocates that the
sovereign rights of the coastal states should be restricted to "nonambiguous[ly]" defined shelf regions, and that the exploitability
test should be eliminated from the Convention on the Continental
Shelf. The shelf area within the sovereign rights of coastal states
would then be limited to the region lying between the outer limits
of the territorial sea and the two hundred metre bathymetric con54
tour line or "some other readily definable boundary. "
The Commission's proposal continues with the suggestion that
the international community's title to these vast and potentially
wealth-producing regions should be administered by an agency
established for the purpose: the United Nations Marine Resources
Agency. This would be invested with the following titles, tasks and
obligations:
It should control and administer international marine resources;
hold ownership rights; and grant, lease or use these rights in accordance with the principles of economic efficiency. It should function
with the independence and efficiency of the International Bank. However, it should distribute the returns from such exploitation in accord-

ance with directives issued by the United Nations General Assembly.
51. Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, New Dimensions for the

United Nations, The Problem of the Next Decade 41-46 (17th Report 1966) [hereinafter cited as "17th Report"]. See also F. Christy & A. Scott, The Common Wealth
in Ocean Fisheries 238-42 (1965).
52. 17th Report, supra note 51, at 4-4.
53. Id. at44-45.
54. Id. at 45.
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Such an agency would present a viable alternative to the anarchy that
now prevails, and it would, therefore, be in the legitimate interest of
most nations to encourage and support the UN Marine Resources
Agency. 55

Attractive as this blueprint for utopia undoubtedly is, it reflects
the "otherworldliness" which constitutes both the attractiveness and
the impracticality of most utopian plans. The kindliest criticism
is that it lacks any proposals for the transition from the present
situation.56 Yet, the modalities, policies, strategies, timetables and

institutions of the transition from a world order of competing
sovereignties to one observing the Rule of Law are more significant
than the blueprints of such timeless ideals as those to be found in
the Seventeenth Report. In contrast with the recommendations of
the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, this writer has
suggested elsewhere 57 a far more modest regime for the international control of exploration and exploitation activities on the seabed and in its subsoil beyond the two hundred metre bathymetric
contour line. Although this regime is far more modest than that
proposed in the Seventeenth Report, it may appear ambitious when
compared with the contemporary system. In place of the Commission's international administrative agency this writer proposes the
establishment of a comprehensive treaty regime which would take
55. Id. at44.
56. These points are in agreement with Professor Burke's criticism of this section
of the 17th Report in Law and the New Technologies, The Law of the Sea: Offshore
Boundaries and Zones 204 (L. Alexander ed. 1967).
He also points out id., at 223, that:
...
the proposed UN Marine Resources Agency has very little, if any,
chance of birth unless the General Assembly is itself reconstituted so that its
decision-making processes, especially those disposing of the new source of
wealth to be placed in its control, more faithfully reflect the present distribution of power, wealth, and skill among its members.
See also by the same author, Legal Aspects of Ocean Exploitation-Status and Outlook, Exploiting the Ocean 1, 11 (Transactions of the 2d Annual MTS Conference &
Exhibit, June 27-29, 1966).
This writer's criticism is distinguishable from Professor Burke's on the ground
that, in this writer's view, utopian blue prints are, by definition, timeless and "not of
this world" and hence, outside the historical process. They cannot affect the direction
of historical development until modalities and strategies of transition have been established. Then, perhaps, a utopian blue print may provide the motivating goal in the
minds of men for accepting a program for its achievement. But this program, and the
strategies of the transition, condition historical events; and the compromises and adjustments to which the modalities and strategies must conform eventually determine the
form of the resulting institutions as they develop in the process of conflict, negotiation,
decision and implementation.
57. L. Goldie, Davey Jones's Locker 39-54.
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into account the national security problems of coastal states, assure
internationally supported exclusive titles to take mineral resources
from the seabed and subsoil of the ocean below the two hundred
metre depth without derogating from the rights of interested states
to retain control of those resources, and to secure titles and transactions concerning the resources once they have been removed from
the seabed or the oceans' subsoil.
The proposal is to put forward procedures for the allocation of
rights over mineral resources on the seabed and in the subsoil of
the deep oceans and beyond both territorial waters and the region
of the continental shelf (which is to be defined only in terms of a
depth of two hundred metres), and secondly to set forth the principles of a regime providing for the recognition and reception of
transnationally 5 valid and marketable titles to those resources.

9

This second group of proposals both outlines the terms and the
58. "Transnationally" here is an adverbial variant of the adjective "transnational"
made popular by Judge Jessup in his book "Transnational Law" (1956). He defines
the term id. at 2, as follows:
: " * I shall use, instead of "international law", the term "transnational law"
to include all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national
frontiers. Both public and private international law are included, as are other
rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories. (Footnotes
omitted.)
Judge Jessup appended a n. 3 to this quotation which is as follows:
Myres McDougal has familiarized us with the use of the adjective "transnational" to describe groups whose composition or activities transcend national
frontiers, but he does not apply the term to law in the sense in which it is
used here. Joseph E. Johnson suggested more broadly the utility of the word
"transnational" in place of "international" in his address of June 15, 1955, at
the annual meeting of the Harvard Foundation and Law School Alumni. Occasional use of the word has also been made by . . . Corbett, The Study of
International Law 50 (1955), and by . . . Nussbaum, A Concise History of
the Law of Nations, (rev. ed. 1954).
"Transnationally valid and marketable titles" may, hence be defined as those titles
which depend, for their validity, upon a regime transcending domestic law even though
their effectiveness is dependent upon their recognition and reception in domestic tribunals and as an adjunct of domestic property law.
59. This treaty regime could equally well be established by adding new articles
to the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, or, alternatively, by means of a fifth
Convention on the Law of the Sea, possibly to be named the "Convention on the Resources of the Seabed and Subsoil of the High Seas." On the other hand, to add these
proposed articles to the Continental Shelf Convention could be very misleading. Despite
the fact that they also offer procedures for exercising sovereign rights in submarine
areas, and create thereby means of securing titles to resources won from the seabed
and subsoil of the oceans, the recognition of claims, the allocation of authority, and the
procedures suggested in this writer's proposals operate on the basis of quite different
principles from those set forth in the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. To
place these two sets of operating rules in the same Convention could, therefore, create
confusion-especially in matters of interpretation.
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means of development of an international (or, better, transnational)
regime of recognition-of "full faith and credit"-to be accorded
by the authorities of all states who are parties to the regime to titles
allocated by each state and pertaining to resources won from the
bed and subsoil of the deep oceans. To be more explicit: the intention here is to propose the principles of a regime governing the
assurance of titles created under the municipal law of each state,
by the recognition of those titles in the courts of all the others
through an international agreement, and by means of establishing,
under public international treaty law, conflict of laws standards and
obligations of recognition. These goals, so this study argues, could
be realized, at least to a substantial degree, by taking the Plenipotentiary and the Administrative Conferences of the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) 6 0 as models for the development
of organizational machinery to take effective action in the matter
of allocations (in the present context this would be the allocation
of areas and of privileges, to be called "Zones of Special Jurisdiction") and to provide workable demarcations between different
uses." Thus, certain areas whose resources might otherwise subject
60. A detailed review of the analogies which may profitably be drawn from the
ITU to resolve problems of the allocation of authority to regulate submarine industrial
activity is to be the subject of a collateral study by this writer. In the second article
there will be a detailed discussion of, and proposals for, the creation and vesting, as
well as the recording and evidencing, of states' rights over exploration, exploitation
activities in submarine regions beyond the continental shelf.
For a study of the radio spectrum as a common property natural resource and
proposals for its rational management (at the domestic level only, however) by means
of controlled access-the problem now to be faced by the world community in the
context of the resources of the ocean floor-see H. Levin, New Technology and the Old
Regulation in Radio Spectrum Management, 56 Am. Economic Rev. 339 (1966).
61. Article 4.1 of the International Telecommunications Convention, done at
Montreux, 12 November 1965, T.I.A.S. No. 6267 at 13 sets out the purposes of the Union
as follows:
(a) to maintain and extend international cooperation for the improvement
and rational use of telecommunications of all kinds;
(b) to promote the development of technical facilities and their most efficient
operation with a view to improving the efficiency of telecommunications
services, increasing their usefulness and making them, so far as possible,
generally available to the public;
(c) to harmonize the actions of nations in the attainment of those common
ends.
The more specific principles of paragraph 2 of this Article are also relevant. Subparagraph a) should be particularly noted.
It is as follows:
2. To this end, the Union shall in particular:
(a) effect allocation of the radio frequency spectrum and registration of
radio frequency assignments in order to avoid harmful interference
between radio stations of different countries.
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them to conflicting multiple uses, or to over-use, would be preserved
Article 5.1 describes the Plenipotentiary Conference as "the supreme organ of the
Union." See also Article 6.1.
Article 6.2 sets out the Plenipotentiary Conference's duties and calls upon it to:
(a) determine the general policies for fulfilling the purposes of the Union
prescribed in Article 4 of this Convention;
(b) consider the report by the Administrative Council on its activities and
those of the Union since the previous Plenipotentiary Conference;
(c) establish the basis for the budget of the Union and determine a fiscal
limit for the expenditure of the Union until the next Plenipotentiary
Conference;
(d) fix the basic salaries, the salary scales and the system of allowances and
pensions for all the officials of the Union;
(e) finally approve the accounts of the Union;
(f) elect the Members of the Union which are to serve on the Administrative
Council;
(g) elect the Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-General and fix
the dates of their taking office;
(h) revise the Convention if it considers this necessary;
(i) conclude or revise, if necessary, agreements between the Union and other
international organizations, examine any provisional agreements with
such organizations concluded, on behalf of the Union, by the Administrative Council, and take such measures in connection therewith as it deems
appropriate;
(j) deal with such other telecommunications questions as may be necessary.
See T.I.A.S. No. 6267 at 15-16.
Article 7.1 describes Administrative Conferences as comprising:
(a) world administrative conferences;
(b) regional administrative conferences.
See T.I.A.S. No. 6267 at 16.
Article 7.2 relates to administrative conferences and provides:
Administrative conferences shall normally be convened to consider specific
telecommunication matters. Only items included in their agenda may be discussed by such conferences. The decisions of such conferences must in all
circumstances be in conformity with the provisions of the Convention.
See T.I.A.S. No. 6267 at 16.
Article 7.3 provides:
(1) The agenda of a world administrative conference may include:
(a) the partial revision of the Administrative Regulations listed in 203;
(b) exceptionally, the complete revision of one or more of those Regulations;
(c) any other question of a worldwide character within the competence
of the conference.
(2) The agenda of a regional administrative conference may provide only
for specific telecommunication questions of a regional nature, including
instructions to the International Frequency Registration Board regarding
its activities in respect of the region concerned, provided such instructions
do not conflict with the interests of other regions. Furthermore, the decisions of such a conference must in all circumstances be in conformity
with the provisions of the Administrative Regulations.
See T.I.A.S. No. 6267 at 16-17.
Article 7.4- provides:
(1) The agenda of an administrative conference shall be determined by the
Administrative Council with the conference of a majority of the Members
of the Union in the case of a world administrative conference, or a
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from becoming arenas of intractable disputes. While negotiation
and agreement could effectively achieve an acceptable distribution
if the delicate task of allocating mineral-bearing submarine areas
remained the function of the Plenipotentiary Conference, the recordation of rights already established should be left to an appropriate administrative agency. Hence, central to that study was the
proposal that regional agencies, with necessarily, a central index in
the United Nations Secretariat, should be established to carry out
evidentiary and recording functions. (These agencies would have
no authority to grant titles.) The primary function of such institutions would be to ensure that the whole world has effective notice of
the existence of recorded rights.
In concluding this brief outline of the proposed regime the point
should be emphasized that individuals, corporations, and indeed,
states, should be perfectly free to invoke or not to invoke at their
discretion the foregoing principles. They might, conceivably, prefer
to carry on a specific submarine activity outside the proposed regime
and in secret. If, for example, states do not invoke the procedures
suggested above, then their citizens and the corporate entities established under their laws may still mine in the seabed and subsoil outside the zones of Special Jurisdiction and beyond the continental
shelves (defined in terms of the two hundred metre bathymetric
contour line) and the territorial waters of other states, but only on
the basis of the general international law privilege of taking the
resource, and subject to the disabilities and exposures of that privilege. In addition, should a dispute as to title come before the courts
of a third state (or before an international tribunal) over a shipment of oil, for example, taken from a seabed operation outside
territorial waters and continental shelf regions (as defined by the
two hundred metre bathymetric contour line) between a state (or its
citizens or corporate entities) asserting ownership under the general
majority of the Members belonging to the region concerned in the case of
a regional administrative conference, subject to the provisions of 76.
(2) This agenda shall include any question which a Plenipotentiary Conference has directed to be placed on the agenda.
(3) The following items may also be included in the agenda of a world administrative conference dealing with radiocommunication:
(a) the election of the members of the International Frequency Registration Board in accordance with 172 to 174;
(b) instructions to the Board regarding its activities and a review of
those activities.
See T.I.A.S. No. 6267 at 17.
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and traditional privilege of appropriating items of the seas' wealth,
and a state (or its citizens or corporate entities) which was acting
under the regime proposed in this article, then, analogously with the
''race-notice" title recording statutes found in many states of the
United States, the rights established under the treaty regime should
prevail over those derived from traditional concepts and practices
permitting appropriations in, or under, the high seas. Thus, the
gentle pressure of self-interest would continually tend to extend the
ambit of this regime as more and more states come to accept its
beneficent protection of their enterprises.
VI
CONCLUSION
Despite the strong argument which has been presented for holding that the framers of the Continental Shelf Convention did not
contemplate the extended meaning given to it in recent years by a
number of leading authorities in the field, it is clear that as undersea technology and states' maritime ambitions and greed develop,
the exploitability test will be resorted to more and more to justify
an "enclosure movement" far out into the oceans-an enclosure
movement which could bid fair to swallow up vast reaches of the
high seas. This is a possibility, it is submitted, which every effort
should be made to avoid.
Adequate assurance that the exploitability test will not be used to
justify extravagant state claims of sovereignty over the seas cannot
be effectuated merely by the logical validity of the strict interpretation of the Continental Shelf Convention. More is needed. This can
best be achieved by a treaty regime spelling out the procedures for
allocation to states of exclusive rights to control exploration and
exploitation activities for minerals over specified areas of the seabed and subsoil, and for ensuring the general recognition, by means
of a transnationally effective system of full faith and credit, of
rights, titles and transactions made under the laws of the appropriate signatory states. As reliances upon the transactions and titles
derived from this regime multiply, so will states' interests in and
commitments to the regime increase. In this way interest and involvement will provide the guarantee of a continuing support to a degree
that the mere paper blueprint of an ideal regime could not attain.
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APPENDIX I
WEST COAST OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF MAPS
1. Oregon (Tillamook & Newport) Map
(a)

Leasing blocks entirely beyond the 600 foot bathymetric contour line.

Lease No.
P-067
P-066
P-065
(b)

Coordinates
43N 67W
42N 67W
42N 66W

Lessee(s)
Shell
Shell
Shell

Leasing blocks partially beyond the 600 foot bathymetric contour line.

P-018

32N 63W

Standard

2. California (Eureka) Map
(a)

Leasing blocks entirely beyond the 600 foot bathymetric contour line.

P-022
(b)

55N 43W

Shell

Leasing blocks partially beyond the 600 foot bathymetric contour line.

P-023
P-021
P-020
P-019
P-018

55N
51N
50N
49N
48N

44W
43W
43W
43W
43W

Shell
Shell
Shell
Shell
Shell

3. California (Point Arena) Map
Leasing blocks partially beyond the 600 foot bathymetric contour line.
P-034
P-033

33N 35W
32N 35W

Shell
Shell

4. California (San Francisco) Map
Leasing blocks partially beyond the 600 foot bathymetric contour line.
P-057

40N 52W

Shell

5. California (Carmel & Morro Bay) Map
Leasing blocks partially beyond the 600 foot bathymetric contour line.
P-064
P-063
P-062
P-061
P-060

42N
41N
38N
37N
36N

57W
57W
55W
55W
55W

Shell
Shell
Humble/Standard
Humble/Standard
Humble/Standard
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6. California (Channel Islands) Maps

(a)

Leasing blocks partially beyond the 600 foot bathymetric contour line.

Lease No.
P-0197
P-0195

Coordinates
54N 81W*
54N 79W*

P-0192
P-0193
P-0197
P-0196
P-0195

54N
54N
53N
53N
53N

P-0193
P-0191

53N 78W N
53N 76W

P-0189
P-0188
P-0187
P-0186
P-0237

53N
53N
53N
53N
50N

75W N Y2*
74W
73W
72W
68W

P-0179
P-0178
P-0231
P-0230

49N
49N
49N
49N

81W
80W
68W
67W

P-0229

49N 66W

P-0228

49N 65W

P-0175

48N 80W*

P-0174
P-0221
P-0220

48N 79W*
48N 66W
48N 65W

P-0219
P-0218

48N 64W
48N 63W

P-0170
P-0172
P-0171

47N 78W*
47N 77W
47N 76W N

P-0169

47N 76W S Y/2

P-0206

46N 67W'

P-0201

46N 66W*

P-0200

46N 65W*

P-0210

47N 62W

77W*
78W*
81W*
80W*
79W*

Ya

'/*

Lessee(s)
Humble/Std.Ca .1.
Humble/Atl.Ri ch/
Std.Cal.
Union
Humble/Std.Ca
Humble/Std.Ca II.
Humble/Std.Ca .1.
Humble/Atl.Ri
Std.Cal.
oh/
Humble/Std.Ca .1.
Humble/Atl.Ri
Std.Cal.
Humble/Std.Ca .1.
Humble
Humble
Humble
Union/Gulf/T exaco/
Mobil
Humble/Std.Ca l.
Humble
Humble
Union/Gulf/
Texaco/Mobil
Union/Gulf/
Texaco/Mobil
Union/Gulf/
Texaco/Mobil
Humble/Atl.Rich/
Std.Cal.
Humble/Std.Cal.
Humble/Std.Cal.
Union/Gulf/
Texaco/Mobil
Union/Gulf
Pauley/Ashland/Colo/
Huber/Kewanee/Midwest/
Husky
Union/Mobil
Union/Mobil
Humble/Atl.Rich/
Std.Cal.
Humble/Atl.Rich/
Std.Cal.
Humble/Atl.Rich/
Std.Cal.
Humble/Atl.Rich/
Std.Cal.
Humble/Atl.Rich/
Std.Cal.
Humble/Std.Cal.
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Lease No.
P-0209
P-0204P-0203
P-0202
(b)

Coordinates
47N 61W
46N 60W
46N 59W
46N 58W
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Lessee(s)
Humble/Std.Cal.
Humble/Std.Cal.
Union/Mobil
Union/Mobil

Leasing blocks entirely beyond the 600 foot bathymetric contour line.
1
78W S Y *
77W N Y*
75W S *
80W
79W
78W
77W
75W
74W
69W
79W
69W
68W
67W
66W

P-0190
P-0185
P-0184
P-0183
P-0182
P-0181
P-0180
P-0238
P-0177
P-0232
P-0223
P-0222
P-0213

53N
53N
53N
52N
52N
52N
52N
52N
52N
SON
49N
49N
48N
48N
47N

P-0212

47N 65W

P-0211

47N 64W

P-0205
P-0199
P-0198

46N 61W
45N 60W*
45N 59W*

P-0194

P-0192

Humble/Std.Cal.
Union
Humble
Shell
Humble
Humble
Humble/Std.Cal.
Humble
Humble
Humble
Humble
Humble
Humble
Humble
Humble/Atl.Rich/
Std.Cal.
Humble/Atl.Rich/
Std.Cal.
Humble/Atl.Rich/
Std.Cal.
Humble/Std.Cal.
Humble
Humble

Note: (1) The sequence of the above listings is in terms of map coordinates.
(2) The standard acreage for the leasing blocks in all of the above maps is 5760
acres. Where a block's area is less than this owing to the delimitation of a state's
territorial waters (the United States being entitled to lease only the submarine
areas lying seaward of the 3-mile limit) or the fact that the block has been cut in
half, the coordinates are marked with an asterisk (*).
(3) The oil company abbreviations used above are:
Ashland-Ashland Oil & Refining Co.
At. Rich.-Atlantic Richfield Co.
Colo.-Colorado Oil & Gas Corp.
Gulf-Gulf Oil Corp.
Huber-J. M. Huber Corp.
Humble-Humble Oil & Refining Co.
Husky-Husky Oil Co.
Kewanee-Kewanee Oil Co.
Midwest-Midwest Oil Corp.
Mobil-Mobil Oil Corp.
Pauley-Pauley Petroleum, Inc.
Shell-Shell Oil Co.
Standard-Standard Oil Co.
Std. Cal.-Standard Oil Co. of California
Texaco-Texaco, Inc.
Union-Union Oil Co. of California
(4) For an early report on the drilling activities in the Santa Barbara Channel,
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as well as an illuminating map, see Armstrong, Santa Barbara Channel action
continues at a brisk pace, 66 Oil & Gas J. 119 (April 29, 1968).
(5) Although the Santa Barbara Channel leases beyond the 600 foot bathymetric
contour line may appear, at first blush, to be justified only under the exploitability
test, yet there is a certain appeal in a United States argument for an exclusive
claim to exercise continental shelf rights over the seabed and subsoil mineral resources of the Santa Barbara Channel in terms of the equitable consideration
which the special nature of the geographical unity of the whole seabed between
the Channel Islands and the mainland coast with the continental shelf region.
This concept of submarine geographical or geological unity, relevant when the
coastal state is sovereign of two sides of a channel or gulf having a depth of
more than 100 fathoms, should have some force and validity independently of
other considerations, such as exploitability. Unfortunately, however, such a concept has not been embodied in the Continental Shelf Convention, nor is there
adequate support for asserting that it is part of the continental shelf doctrine as
a customary law rule. Be that as it may, the abrogation of the exploitability test
(as advocated in this article) might well demand further consideration of possible state claims over the whole of such submarine terraces which plunge to
more than 100 fathoms as the Santa Barbara Channel, the Aegean Sea, the Siburyan Sea and the Mindanao Sea. It is of interest to note that the International
Court of Justice held in the Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. 116, and independently
of any reference to the continental shelf doctrine, that not only the seabed and
subsoil of the Vest Fjorden (which exceeds 200 metres of depth in places), but
its waters and superambient air were within the territorial sovereignty of Norway. Furthermore, despite the fact that the Norwegian Trench plunges to depths
considerably in excess of 200 metres, the United Kingdom, as the state occupying
the opposite coast of the North Sea, has accepted as valid the Norwegian claim
to assert continental shelf rights far to the westward of the Trench and out to a
median line in the North Sea. See Agreement Between the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of
the Kingdom of Norway Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf
Between the Two Countries, signed March 10, 1965.
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